The Legal Battle Beneath the Sea: Who Protects the World’s Undersea Internet Cables?

Manoj Ambat

3 days ago

23 min read

Introduction: The Internet Has an Ocean Floor

Modern civilisation depends on an extraordinary infrastructure that most people will never see. Every day, financial transactions cross international borders, governments exchange sensitive information, businesses conduct operations across continents, and millions of people communicate through digital platforms. Much of this activity depends on fibre-optic cables laid across the seabed, connecting continents through a network of physical infrastructure hidden beneath the oceans. Although satellites receive considerable public attention, submarine telecommunications cables remain the principal foundation of intercontinental digital connectivity. The International Cable Protection Committee and the United Nations' International Telecommunication Union have repeatedly emphasised their importance to global communications, commerce, financial services, government operations, healthcare and education. These cables are not merely commercial assets belonging to telecommunications companies; they are essential components of the infrastructure that sustains the modern international system. Yet the legal arrangements governing their protection remain divided between international maritime law, domestic criminal legislation, commercial rights, national security policies and the rules governing international conflict.

The strategic significance of this infrastructure becomes clearer when we consider what happens when a major cable is damaged. A disruption can slow internet access, interrupt financial communications, affect businesses and government services, and place pressure on the remaining routes that carry international traffic. The consequences depend on the location of the damage, the capacity of alternative routes, the redundancy built into the network and the number of cables affected. Some failures are quickly absorbed by rerouting traffic, while others can isolate communities or cause prolonged disruption. The vulnerability is particularly serious in regions that depend on a limited number of connections or where several cables converge through narrow maritime corridors. A deliberate attack could therefore cause consequences extending far beyond the physical location of the damaged cable. The legal question is no longer simply who must pay when a ship accidentally cuts a cable. It is who has the authority to prevent deliberate interference, investigate suspicious activity, identify the responsible actors, prosecute offenders and, where appropriate, hold states accountable under international law.

The difficulty is that the seabed is not governed by a single authority. A cable may be owned by a consortium of private companies, pass through the territorial waters and exclusive economic zones of several states, cross the high seas, and connect landing stations in different countries. The vessel suspected of damaging it may fly a different country's flag, be owned through a complex corporate structure and be operated by a company established elsewhere. The government whose communications are disrupted may not be the government with jurisdiction over the vessel or the location of the incident. If the damage is intentional but the evidence remains inconclusive, the problem becomes even more complicated. The state suffering the consequences may strongly suspect hostile interference while lacking sufficient evidence to attribute the incident to a particular government. This is the central legal challenge beneath the sea: the infrastructure is global, but the powers to investigate, enforce the law and impose responsibility remain fragmented.

1. Why Undersea Cables Have Become a Matter of National Security

For much of the modern history of submarine cables, their protection was approached primarily as a matter of telecommunications engineering, commercial investment and maritime safety. Cable operators concentrated on route selection, technical reliability, maintenance, repair arrangements and cooperation with shipping and fishing industries. Accidental damage caused by anchors, fishing equipment, seabed activity and natural events was a familiar operational risk. Governments had an interest in ensuring connectivity, but the cables themselves were often perceived as commercial infrastructure rather than as strategic assets vulnerable to hostile action. That distinction has become increasingly difficult to maintain as societies have moved essential functions into digital networks and as geopolitical competition has extended into maritime infrastructure.

The modern digital economy relies on physical systems that connect data centres, cloud computing platforms, banking networks, communications providers, government agencies and international businesses. A submarine cable can carry data belonging to multiple countries and industries simultaneously. It may support services that are commercially operated but essential to public administration, national defence, emergency response or economic stability. The resulting dependence creates a security problem that cannot be addressed exclusively by the cable owner. A private operator may possess technical expertise and responsibility for repairs, but it cannot independently exercise the maritime enforcement powers of a sovereign state, compel foreign authorities to investigate a suspected offence or resolve questions of international responsibility.

The strategic problem also extends beyond physical destruction. A damaged cable may be only one element of a broader attempt to disrupt communications, test a country's response capabilities, create uncertainty or place pressure on a rival without initiating an openly acknowledged military confrontation. Suspicious vessel movements, interference with repair operations, unauthorised activities near critical routes and the manipulation of regulatory processes may all raise security concerns, although none automatically proves sabotage. The challenge for governments is to distinguish ordinary maritime activity, negligence, commercial disputes and accidental damage from conduct intended to undermine critical infrastructure. That distinction is not merely political; it determines which legal rules may apply, what evidence must be collected and which enforcement measures are lawful.

This is why submarine cable protection increasingly belongs within the broader framework of critical infrastructure security. A cable network must be treated as a system requiring prevention, detection, investigation, resilience and recovery. Physical protection is only one part of the answer. States must also establish clear procedures for reporting damage, preserve evidence, coordinate with operators, facilitate emergency repairs and share information with other jurisdictions. The International Telecommunication Union and the International Cable Protection Committee established the International Advisory Body for Submarine Cable Resilience in November 2024, recognising the importance of cooperation between governments and industry in improving resilience, reducing damage and supporting timely repairs.

2. UNCLOS: The Foundation of the International Legal Framework

The principal international treaty governing the legal use of the oceans is the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, commonly known as UNCLOS. It establishes a framework for maritime zones, navigation, coastal-state jurisdiction, the use of the seabed and the rights and obligations of states. Submarine cables are expressly addressed in several provisions, particularly Articles 58, 79 and 112 to 115. These provisions establish important rights and duties, but they were not designed as a comprehensive modern security regime for a world in which digital communications have become indispensable to national economies and international relations.

Article 58 recognises the freedom of other states to lay submarine cables and pipelines in the exclusive economic zone, subject to the relevant provisions of the Convention and the obligation to have due regard to the rights and duties of the coastal state. Article 79 addresses submarine cables and pipelines on the continental shelf, while preserving the coastal state's rights in relation to exploration and exploitation of natural resources and certain regulatory matters. Article 112 recognises the right of all states to lay submarine cables and pipelines on the seabed of the high seas beyond the continental shelf. Together, these provisions reflect an important principle: international connectivity cannot depend entirely on the permission of individual coastal states wherever a cable route crosses the oceans. At the same time, cable-laying freedoms do not erase applicable legal obligations or permit operators to disregard the legitimate rights of other states.

The legal architecture is therefore based on balancing different interests rather than granting any single country complete control over the infrastructure. A coastal state has extensive sovereignty in its territorial sea, subject to the applicable international rules. Its powers are more limited in the exclusive economic zone, where it enjoys specified sovereign rights and jurisdiction but must also respect the rights of other states. Beyond national jurisdiction, the freedoms associated with the high seas and the seabed become particularly important. These distinctions matter because a government's ability to monitor, regulate, investigate and intervene in relation to a cable-related incident depends substantially on where the incident occurs, the conduct involved and the legal basis asserted for the intervention.

UNCLOS is consequently neither irrelevant nor wholly inadequate. It provides a binding foundation for cable-related rights and duties, but it leaves difficult questions concerning modern security threats, enforcement cooperation and the attribution of covert interference. The legal challenge is to determine how existing rules apply to contemporary conduct and where further national legislation, international agreements or coordinated practices are necessary. The absence of a single global cable-protection authority does not mean that the seabed is a lawless space. It means that the applicable legal framework must be assembled from different rules, each with its own scope, jurisdictional limits and evidentiary requirements.

3. What Happens When Someone Cuts a Cable?

One of the most directly relevant provisions is Article 113 of UNCLOS. It requires states to adopt laws and regulations making certain acts of breaking or injuring submarine cables beneath the high seas punishable offences. The provision addresses wilful damage and damage caused through culpable negligence where the conduct is liable to interrupt or obstruct telegraphic or telephonic communications. It also covers conduct calculated or likely to result in such damage, subject to the treaty's stated exception for acts undertaken to save life or ships after necessary precautions have been taken. The provision establishes an important international obligation, but its practical enforcement depends on states adopting and applying appropriate domestic legislation.

This distinction between an international obligation and a domestic offence is crucial. UNCLOS does not operate as a universal criminal court with its own police force, investigators and prison system. Instead, it requires states to create relevant legal rules and gives the international framework a basis for cooperation and accountability. The exact criminal charge, available penalties, jurisdictional reach, evidentiary standards and procedural requirements will depend on the applicable domestic law. Where a cable is damaged in an area beyond national jurisdiction, the identity and nationality of the vessel, the status of the alleged perpetrator and the relevant connections to states may become particularly significant.

Article 114 addresses another practical problem: damage caused by cable owners while laying or repairing their own cables. States must adopt laws and regulations requiring persons subject to their jurisdiction who own submarine cables and cause damage to another cable while laying or repairing their own to bear the repair costs. Article 115 addresses compensation where a shipowner can establish that an anchor, net or other fishing gear was sacrificed to avoid injuring a submarine cable, provided reasonable precautionary measures were taken beforehand. These provisions demonstrate that the international law of submarine cables is concerned not only with sabotage but also with the allocation of costs and risks arising from ordinary maritime activities.

However, the legal questions become much harder when the damage is deliberate, the responsible actor is unknown or the incident occurs in a jurisdiction where enforcement powers are limited. A state may have enacted legislation prohibiting cable damage but still lack a practical mechanism to obtain evidence from a foreign vessel, secure cooperation from the flag state or compel the production of relevant records. A cable owner may have a contractual or civil claim but face difficulties identifying the defendant, establishing jurisdiction or enforcing a judgment across borders. A government may suspect hostile state involvement but be unable to demonstrate the required connection between the physical act and the foreign state. The existence of a prohibition is therefore only the beginning of effective protection; the law must also provide workable routes from detection to investigation, attribution and remedy.

4. Who Has Jurisdiction Over the Ocean Floor?

The answer depends on the maritime zone in which the incident takes place. In the territorial sea, which may extend up to 12 nautical miles from a state's baselines, the coastal state exercises sovereignty subject to the applicable rules of international law. It generally has a stronger legal basis to enforce domestic laws against relevant conduct occurring within that zone. Nevertheless, the precise authority to regulate cable installation, navigation, repair activity and foreign vessels must still be assessed under the applicable maritime rules rather than assumed to be unlimited.

The exclusive economic zone, or EEZ, presents a more complicated situation. It may extend up to 200 nautical miles from the baselines, but it is not simply an extension of a state's territorial sovereignty. Under UNCLOS, the coastal state has specified sovereign rights and jurisdiction, including in relation to natural resources and certain installations, while other states retain freedoms that include navigation and the laying of submarine cables, subject to the Convention. The resulting legal balance is fundamental to international connectivity. If every coastal state could exercise unrestricted authority over all foreign cable operations in its EEZ, global infrastructure could become vulnerable to excessive regulation, political pressure and competing claims of control.

At the same time, cable protection cannot be reduced to the proposition that coastal states have no legitimate role beyond their territorial seas. Their security interests, their domestic legislation, their rights under UNCLOS and the circumstances of a particular incident may all be relevant. What matters is that enforcement must rest on a recognised legal basis and respect the rights of other states. A coastal state cannot automatically board, detain or prosecute a foreign vessel merely because it considers the vessel suspicious. Nor does a vessel's presence near a cable automatically establish a criminal offence. Jurisdiction, evidence, proportionality and the applicable maritime rules remain essential.

On the high seas, the position becomes more demanding. Ships generally fall under the jurisdiction of their flag states, subject to the exceptions recognised by international law. UNCLOS establishes duties for flag states concerning the effective exercise of jurisdiction and control over ships flying their flags. Article 113 also requires states to adopt relevant laws concerning cable damage beneath the high seas. Yet a government whose cable has been damaged may have limited direct enforcement authority over a foreign vessel in those waters. It may need to depend on the flag state, the nationality of the suspect, applicable domestic law, international cooperation or another recognised jurisdictional basis.

This fragmented structure explains why the question of protection is so difficult. The state that suffers the economic consequences may not control the waters in which the incident occurred. The state with the clearest territorial jurisdiction may not own the cable. The flag state may have the strongest connection to the vessel but little political incentive to cooperate. Where a suspected operation is linked to a state actor, the problem may become one of international responsibility rather than merely criminal prosecution. Effective protection therefore requires cooperation across jurisdictional boundaries instead of reliance on any single country's enforcement powers.

5. The Problem of Sabotage and the Attribution Gap

The most serious legal challenge arises when cable damage appears deliberate but the identity of the perpetrator remains uncertain. A vessel may have dragged an anchor across the seabed, damaged a cable during another operation or engaged in conduct that authorities consider suspicious. Such facts may justify an investigation, but they do not automatically establish sabotage, much less responsibility on the part of a foreign government. Sound legal analysis must distinguish between an observed incident, reasonable suspicion, proof of a criminal offence and attribution of the conduct to a state under international law.

Attribution is especially difficult in maritime environments because the physical evidence may be limited, distributed across several jurisdictions or controlled by private entities. Investigators may need vessel tracking data, anchor or equipment records, cable fault information, maintenance records, communications, witness statements and technical analysis. The vessel's ownership structure may differ from its flag registration, and the people operating it may not be the individuals who ultimately directed its actions. A covert operation may also be designed to resemble an accident. Even where there is compelling circumstantial evidence, the legal standard applicable to a criminal prosecution, a civil claim, a diplomatic allegation or a finding of state responsibility may differ.

This creates a gap between strategic suspicion and legal accountability. Governments may be confident that an incident fits a wider pattern of hostile activity without possessing evidence sufficient to support a criminal conviction or a legally defensible attribution to a particular state. Public accusations can carry serious diplomatic consequences, while premature enforcement measures against a vessel may create separate legal disputes. Conversely, a lack of immediate proof should not prevent authorities from preserving evidence, investigating the incident and taking lawful preventive measures. The objective must be to improve the quality and speed of investigation while maintaining the distinction between intelligence assessments and evidence capable of supporting legal conclusions.

International law offers several possible routes for addressing deliberate interference, but none automatically resolves every case. Domestic criminal law may apply where jurisdictional requirements are satisfied. The law of state responsibility may become relevant if conduct attributable to a state breaches an international obligation. Depending on the nature, scale and consequences of an operation, rules governing the prohibition on the use of force and the right of self-defence may also become relevant. These are distinct legal questions. Damage to a cable does not automatically constitute an armed attack, and a suspicious incident does not by itself prove a violation of international law by a state.

The problem is not simply the absence of rules. It is the difficulty of connecting the facts of a complex cross-border incident to the precise legal elements of an offence or international wrong. Better surveillance, evidence-sharing arrangements, technical standards and joint investigative procedures can help close this gap. But they must be designed to preserve due process and prevent legitimate commercial or maritime activity from being treated as hostile merely because it takes place near sensitive infrastructure.

6. Are Submarine Cables Protected During War?

The legal position becomes even more complicated when cable interference takes place during an armed conflict. Submarine communications infrastructure may support civilian communications, commercial activity, government functions and military operations at the same time. Its importance to a state's economy does not automatically make it a lawful military objective, and its connection to military communications does not eliminate the need to apply the relevant rules of international humanitarian law.

The law of armed conflict requires parties to distinguish between civilian objects and military objectives. Where an object qualifies as a military objective, attacks remain subject to applicable rules governing proportionality and precautions in attack. These principles create difficult questions for submarine cables because a single system may carry communications for numerous users, including civilians in states that are not parties to the conflict. An operation that disables one strategically important route may therefore produce effects extending far beyond the intended military purpose.

The legal analysis must examine the particular cable, its actual use, the expected military advantage, the foreseeable effects on civilian populations and the feasible precautions available. A cable that carries military communications may require a different assessment from one whose use is predominantly civilian, but no universal conclusion can be reached simply by labelling the entire network as strategically important. The possibility of civilian harm, the availability of alternatives and the consequences of widespread communications disruption are all relevant to the applicable legal assessment.

Scholarship on submarine cables in armed conflict has highlighted the lack of a comprehensive, cable-specific treaty regime governing belligerent conduct. This does not mean that states are free to attack submarine cables without legal constraints. The law of armed conflict, the law of neutrality, the law of the sea and the general rules governing the use of force may all be relevant, depending on the circumstances. The difficult issue is how those rules apply to modern cable systems and how they interact when civilian and military uses overlap.

A further complication concerns the distinction between a physical attack and a non-kinetic operation. An operation might seek to interfere with a cable's functionality, manipulate its systems or disrupt the communications that depend on it without physically severing the fibre-optic line. Whether such conduct violates a particular rule depends on the nature of the operation, its effects, the relevant legal regime and the evidence available. The legal consequences should not be determined by the method alone. A technologically sophisticated operation may still need to be assessed under established legal principles, even where the precise application of those principles remains contested.

7. The Private Ownership Problem: Who Is Responsible for Protection?

Submarine cable networks are frequently developed, owned or operated by private telecommunications companies and consortia. These arrangements make economic sense because the infrastructure requires substantial investment, specialist expertise and long-term maintenance. Multiple operators may share the cost and capacity of a cable system, while landing stations and network connections are located in different jurisdictions. Private ownership, however, creates a complicated division of responsibilities when the infrastructure faces a security threat.

Cable operators have direct responsibilities for the reliability of their systems, operational monitoring, maintenance arrangements and cooperation with relevant authorities. They are often best placed to identify a technical failure, determine which section of a cable has been affected and organise a repair. Yet private operators do not possess the full range of sovereign powers required to investigate suspected criminal conduct, compel cooperation from foreign vessels or respond to hostile acts against national infrastructure. Nor can they independently resolve disputes between governments over maritime jurisdiction or state responsibility.

Governments, in turn, may depend heavily on information held by private companies while maintaining separate intelligence, law-enforcement and national-security responsibilities. If the legal framework does not clearly establish how technical information is shared, how evidence is preserved and which authority coordinates the response, valuable time may be lost. Operators may face uncertainty about confidentiality, liability, regulatory obligations and the circumstances in which they should disclose sensitive information. Authorities may have relevant intelligence but lack a well-defined process for translating it into evidence suitable for a criminal investigation.

The solution is not to transfer all cable infrastructure into state ownership. Private operators can remain essential participants in the development and maintenance of global connectivity. What is needed is a clearer allocation of responsibilities. Governments should establish reporting requirements for serious incidents, define channels for emergency coordination, facilitate lawful information-sharing and create transparent procedures for protecting sensitive commercial and security information. Operators should maintain tested contingency plans, participate in exercises with relevant authorities and ensure that security and repair arrangements are integrated into the design and management of cable systems.

This approach recognises that responsibility for protecting a global network is necessarily shared, but shared responsibility must not become an excuse for institutional inaction. Private operators should not be expected to perform sovereign functions, while governments should not assume that commercial redundancy alone is sufficient to address deliberate interference. A coherent system must connect engineering resilience with legal authority, public accountability and international cooperation.

8. Can a Coastal State Create Security Zones Around Cables?

One of the most sensitive policy questions is whether coastal states should be permitted to create exclusion zones or impose restrictions on navigation around important submarine cables. From a security perspective, restricting anchoring or certain activities near vulnerable infrastructure may reduce accidental damage and make suspicious conduct easier to detect. From a maritime-law perspective, however, a blanket prohibition on navigation or other lawful uses of the sea can conflict with the rights recognised under UNCLOS, particularly in the exclusive economic zone and on the high seas.

The distinction between a narrowly tailored safety measure and an attempt to exercise excessive control over international waters is therefore important. Coastal states cannot simply declare that all waters surrounding a cable are subject to unrestricted national control. The legal authority for any measure must be assessed against the relevant maritime zone, the applicable treaty provisions, the rights of other states and the nature of the activity being regulated. A measure intended to protect a cable cannot automatically override the freedoms that international law preserves for other users of the sea.

A more defensible approach would combine clearly communicated cable routes, appropriate charting and navigation information, proportionate measures within recognised legal authority, effective monitoring and cooperation with shipping and fishing industries. Where additional restrictions are considered necessary, states should explain their legal basis and ensure that the measures are consistent with applicable international law. Internationally coordinated practices would also help prevent conflicting national requirements from creating uncertainty for vessels, cable operators and repair ships.

The wider objective should be to make lawful maritime activity safer without transforming cable protection into a justification for unilateral control over international waters. If every state attempted to establish expansive security zones around infrastructure it considered strategically important, the result could be greater maritime tension rather than greater security. Legal clarity is therefore not an obstacle to protection; it is one of the conditions necessary for effective and legitimate protection.

9. Repairing a Cable: A Race Against Time and Bureaucracy

When a cable is damaged, restoration depends on much more than identifying the fault. Specialist repair vessels must be available, the location of the damage must be determined, replacement components and equipment must be secured, and the repair operation must be coordinated with the relevant authorities. Depending on the route and the circumstances, operators may need permits, customs clearance, port access and permission to conduct work in particular maritime zones. A prolonged administrative delay can turn a manageable infrastructure failure into a more serious disruption.

This problem has an important legal dimension. A state may recognise the importance of restoring connectivity while still applying ordinary procedures designed for commercial shipping, construction or maritime operations. Such procedures may be appropriate in normal circumstances but poorly suited to an urgent repair. Conversely, emergency access cannot be treated as an unlimited right to disregard the coastal state's lawful jurisdiction or environmental and safety requirements. The challenge is to create a predictable process that allows legitimate repairs to proceed quickly while preserving the legal rights of the states concerned.

Governments should therefore establish emergency repair protocols before an incident occurs. These should identify the responsible authorities, set out the documentation required for repair vessels, provide expedited procedures where legally permissible and clarify the treatment of equipment, replacement cable and specialist personnel. Where a cable crosses several jurisdictions, neighbouring states and operators should coordinate in advance rather than begin negotiations only after the network has failed. International best practices developed by the cable industry and relevant organisations can support these arrangements, although such guidance does not itself replace binding domestic or international law.

Repair readiness is also a question of strategic resilience. If only a limited number of vessels and specialist teams can carry out repairs in a region, simultaneous incidents could overwhelm available capacity. A legal framework that imposes unnecessary delays, leaves responsibilities unclear or fails to coordinate access may compound the physical vulnerability of the network. Timely repair should therefore be treated as part of national and international infrastructure planning, not merely as a technical matter left to commercial operators.

10. What International Law Still Needs to Address

The international community does not need to begin from an empty legal slate. UNCLOS provides the central framework for cable-related rights and obligations, while domestic legislation, general international law and the rules governing armed conflict address important aspects of damage, responsibility and enforcement. The more pressing need is to make the existing framework operationally effective in the face of modern threats. That requires states to identify where national laws are inadequate, where cooperation is unreliable and where legal uncertainty is delaying the investigation or repair of serious incidents.

First, states should review their domestic laws to ensure that intentional and negligent cable damage can be investigated and prosecuted where the law properly establishes jurisdiction. The review should consider the jurisdictional reach of national offences, available investigative powers, appropriate penalties, corporate responsibilities and the treatment of conduct involving foreign vessels. Legislatures should also examine whether the legal framework adequately addresses interference with cable functionality that may not involve obvious physical destruction. Any expansion of criminal liability must remain sufficiently clear, proportionate and consistent with applicable international obligations.

Second, states should strengthen arrangements for the preservation and exchange of evidence. A cable incident may generate information held by telecommunications operators, maritime authorities, shipping companies, port officials, insurers and law-enforcement agencies. Effective investigations require lawful procedures for securing this information, verifying its reliability and sharing it with the appropriate authorities. Standardised incident-reporting procedures and channels for rapid assistance could reduce delays and help prevent evidence from being lost before an investigation is properly organised.

Third, governments should cooperate more systematically on monitoring, prevention and response. The United Nations General Assembly's 2023 resolution on oceans and the law of the sea highlighted cooperative measures relevant to protecting submarine cables, including monitoring, prevention and response, information-sharing and the adoption of national laws to prosecute offenders. These areas provide a practical starting point for strengthening cooperation without assuming that every country must adopt an identical security model.

Fourth, the international community should consider whether additional agreements or agreed interpretative guidance are needed to address deliberate interference, jurisdictional uncertainty and emergency repair procedures. Any new instrument should complement UNCLOS rather than undermine its carefully negotiated balance between coastal-state rights and international freedoms. It should clarify obligations where necessary, establish practical channels for cooperation and avoid creating opportunities for states to use infrastructure protection as a pretext for unjustified restrictions on navigation or cable deployment.

Finally, resilience must become a measurable objective. Governments and operators should assess the concentration of traffic on vulnerable routes, the availability of alternative connections, repair capacity and the potential consequences of simultaneous failures. The purpose is not to eliminate every possible risk, which would be unrealistic, but to ensure that a single incident does not create disproportionate disruption. Legal reform, engineering resilience and international cooperation should reinforce one another rather than operate as separate policy initiatives.

11. India and the Strategic Importance of Undersea Cable Protection

For India, submarine cable protection is directly connected to economic security, digital sovereignty, maritime strategy and the reliability of essential services. India's expanding digital economy depends on international connectivity for business, cloud services, financial communications, digital public infrastructure and access to global technology networks. Its geographical position in the Indian Ocean also places it near maritime routes of considerable strategic importance. The protection of cables serving Indian landing stations and connecting India to international networks should therefore be considered an integral part of national critical infrastructure planning.

India's legal and policy response must begin with a clear assessment of the domestic laws and regulatory arrangements already applicable to cable installation, landing stations, telecommunications infrastructure, maritime operations and criminal investigation. The relevant question is not simply whether India has laws addressing cable damage, but whether those laws operate coherently across the full lifecycle of an incident: prevention, detection, evidence preservation, jurisdiction, prosecution, civil remedies and rapid restoration. A detailed legal review would need to examine the applicable provisions and their practical implementation rather than assume that a single statute provides a complete answer.

India should also strengthen coordination between telecommunications regulators, maritime authorities, law-enforcement agencies, national-security institutions and private operators. Such coordination is particularly important where technical evidence is held by companies while enforcement powers rest with public authorities. Clear incident-reporting standards, designated coordination mechanisms and tested emergency repair procedures could improve response times and reduce uncertainty. Cooperation with other states bordering the Indian Ocean would also be valuable because cable routes and maritime risks do not stop at national boundaries.

At the regional level, India can contribute to developing shared expectations on the protection of critical undersea infrastructure. Cooperation could include exchanging information about suspicious incidents, improving the notification of cable damage, facilitating repair operations and discussing practical measures to preserve evidence across jurisdictions. Such initiatives need not imply that every incident is hostile or that every maritime activity should be treated as a security threat. Their purpose would be to improve the capacity of participating states to respond lawfully and effectively when serious incidents occur.

India should approach this issue as both a maritime-security priority and a legal-policy opportunity. The country has an interest in preserving freedom of navigation and the lawful international use of submarine cables, while ensuring that its own critical infrastructure is resilient against accidents, criminal conduct and deliberate interference. A balanced approach would combine domestic legal preparedness, public-private cooperation, international engagement and investment in redundancy. For a country seeking greater strategic autonomy in the digital age, reliable international connectivity is not a peripheral technical concern; it is a foundation of economic and national resilience.

12. The Case for a New International Framework

The case for stronger international arrangements does not necessarily require the immediate creation of an entirely new global treaty. A more practical starting point would be to identify the areas in which existing law is reasonably clear and the areas where states, operators and investigators face recurring uncertainty. International guidance could then focus on the operational problems that most directly affect protection: reporting suspicious incidents, preserving evidence, requesting assistance from flag states, coordinating emergency repairs and clarifying the legal considerations relevant to deliberate interference.

A new framework should also distinguish between different categories of incidents. Accidental damage, negligent conduct, criminal sabotage, covert state interference and attacks occurring during armed conflict raise different legal questions. Treating them as if they were interchangeable would create confusion and could encourage disproportionate responses. A credible international arrangement should define the relevant categories carefully, identify the applicable legal principles and provide procedures for cooperation without prejudging responsibility before the evidence is assessed.

One possible direction would be a multilateral arrangement supplementing existing law-of-the-sea obligations through agreed procedures for investigation, evidence preservation, emergency repairs and mutual assistance. Such an arrangement could be developed alongside national legislative reforms and technical resilience standards. It should also recognise the legitimate role of private operators, whose technical knowledge and operational capabilities are indispensable to an effective response. The objective would be to improve coordination and predictability while preserving the fundamental principles of maritime law.

However, no international instrument can guarantee protection if states are unwilling to cooperate or if enforcement depends entirely on political convenience. Legal reform must therefore be accompanied by transparent incident reporting, professional investigative capabilities, adequate repair resources and sustained engagement between governments and industry. A new treaty may eventually prove useful, but the immediate priority is to make existing obligations work more effectively and identify precisely where additional rules would produce practical benefits.

Conclusion: The Law Must Reach the Seabed

The world's undersea internet cables occupy an unusual position in international law. They are privately owned or commercially operated in many instances, yet they support functions essential to public life and national security. They cross maritime zones governed by different legal regimes, connect countries with competing interests and depend on cooperation among governments, businesses and specialist repair operators. Their protection therefore cannot be entrusted exclusively to coastal states, flag states, cable owners or international organisations acting independently.

UNCLOS provides the essential foundation for protecting submarine cables, establishing rights to lay them and obligations concerning certain forms of damage. But the practical challenges of deliberate interference, cross-border evidence gathering, attribution of responsibility, emergency repairs and the application of international law during armed conflict require sustained legal and institutional attention. The central issue is not that international law has no answer to cable damage. It is that the available answers are distributed across multiple legal regimes, and the effectiveness of those regimes depends on jurisdiction, implementation, cooperation and the circumstances of each incident.

The way forward is to strengthen domestic legislation, clarify enforcement procedures, improve international cooperation, protect evidence, accelerate lawful repairs and invest in the resilience of cable networks. India and other states with substantial digital and maritime interests should treat these measures as essential elements of critical infrastructure governance. The private sector must also be integrated into preparedness and response arrangements, because no government can effectively protect a global communications network without the cooperation of the companies that build, operate and maintain it.

Ultimately, the legal battle beneath the sea is about more than protecting fibre-optic cables. It is about preserving the reliability of the infrastructure through which modern societies communicate, trade, govern and cooperate. The oceans may separate continents geographically, but submarine cables connect them economically and digitally. Protecting those connections requires a legal framework capable of balancing maritime freedoms with security, commercial rights with public responsibility, and national interests with the shared need for uninterrupted global connectivity. The question facing the international community is no longer whether these cables matter. It is whether the institutions responsible for protecting them can adapt quickly enough to the strategic realities of the digital age.